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Abstract—The central security concern for systems where 
agents roam is how to establish trust in the agent. We present a 
Fuzzy Logic mechanism to calculate a level of trust and an 
optimal route for a mobile agent system in a smart home. The 
mechanism consists of two parts. The first part calculates a 
trust level at the platform side to decide which actions should 
be allowed by a visiting mobile agent. The second part 
calculates an optimal route at the mobile agent side to decide 
an alternative destination in the case of rejection by a 
platform. Examples are provided from smart home scenarios, 
showing how flexible the proposed mechanism is. 
Keywords-component; mobile agent; trust level; routing 
selection;fuzzy logic;smart home;security 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The strength of a mobile agent is that it can migrate from 
one host in a network to another host that contains an object 
with which the agent wants to interact. The agent can then 
take advantage of being co-located with the object. A well 
designed mobile agent system is fault tolerant, reduces 
network load, overcome network latency, allows agents to 
execute asynchronously and autonomously, adapts to the 
change of environment dynamically, and provides adequate 
security. 
The security problem has two aspects: protecting the 
agent from malicious hosts and protecting the host from 
malicious agents. This paper focuses on the latter issue. We 
refer the reader to Alfalayleh et al [1] for a comprehensive 
survey of the former issue. More particularly, this paper 
addresses the problem of how to decide to what extent a host 
can trust a visiting agent, what to do when the host partially 
trust a visiting agent, and where the agent can go next when 
it is rejected by a host that does not trust the agent at all. 
Our solution to the problem has a wide range of 
applications, but we find it convenient to focus the 
discussion on a concrete setting, for which we use the smart 
home environment. We will discuss our approach using the 
following scenario. 
Consider a smart home scenario where the home owner, 
Dieva and her family, are out on vacation. Dieva’s friend 
Sita is enrolled in the biometric front door lock, so that she 
can look into the house from time to time while Dieva and 
her family are away. The events that occur the first time that 
Sita goes to Dieva’s home are: 
1) Sita arrives at the front door (FD) which is 
noted by the “guest” agent, who will serve Sita 
while she is in the house. The initial trust level 
of the “guest” agent is Low to override the 
biometric authentication process, but since Sita 
has the front door (FD) key, the door opens and 
she can enter the house. 
2) Sita is let in, and the “guest” agent then travels 
to the Home Control System (HCS) to notify the 
HCS that there is a guest entering the house. 
3) Two processes in step 3: 
a. Sita is thirsty; she goes to the kitchen 
searching for water. The kitchen door 
biometric lock does not recognize Sita 
since Sita is not enrolled for biometric 
authentication at the kitchen door 
(KD). Therefore, Sita is not allowed to 
enter the kitchen. 
b. Since she was rejected at the kitchen 
door, Sita decided to watch TV for a 
while. The process is the same as the 
kitchen lock, i.e. the “guest” agent 
travels through the home-control 
system (HCS) to the TV, but this time 
the trust level of the “guest” agent is 
sufficiently high to execute a process 
that turns the TV on. 
4) Three processes in step 4: 
a. While watching TV, Sita tries to go to 
the kitchen for a second time to get 
some water. For the same reason as in 
step 3a, the initial trust level for Sita is 
too low to override the biometric door 
lock for the kitchen. 
b. Sita then tries to open the kitchen door 
(KD) through the home control system 
(HCS). However, she is also gets 
rejected there since it is necessary for 
her to log in before she is allowed to 
perform any tasks. 
c. Sita continues watching TV, and 
suddenly the smart phone (SP) rings, 
and for the same reason as with the 
TV, Sita is allowed to answer the 
phone. It is Dieva and they talked 
briefly. Because of the voice 
recognition in the Smart phone, the 
latter infers that Sita is talking to 
Dieva, the home owner. Therefore, the 
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trust level of the “guest” agent is raised 
to Medium. 
5) After talking to Dieva, Sita is getting really 
thirsty and tries to get some refreshment from 
the kitchen again. Thanks to the interaction with 
the smart phone (SP), the “guest” agent is now 
endowed with a Medium level of trust and can 
start a process that overrides the biometric lock 
on the kitchen door. 
The illustration of the scenario above can be seen in Fig. 
1 below. Dashes lines represent possible routes of the 
“guest” agent, and solid arrows represent actual routes 
travelled. The Internet (Int) will be used in scenarios to be 
presented later. 
Figure 1.  “guest” agent itinerary for the smart home scenario. 
From the scenario above, we can see that on each 
occasion, the level of trust of the “guest” agent is used by the 
platform as a basis for decision making. A visiting agent is 
only allowed to execute on a platform if its trust level is 
sufficiently high to meet the condition set by the platform. 
Similarly the agent must decide where to go, and what to do 
when rejected. 
A. Problem 
The problem is then twofold.  The first aspect of the 
problem is how to calculate the trust level of an agent in such 
a way that neither the agent nor the platform can cheat. The 
second aspect is how to decide where the agent should go 
next in the case of rejection at a previously visited node, 
again without the agent or the platform being able to cheat. 
B. Contribution 
We propose to use fuzzy logic controllers to make the 
decisions, because this provides the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate all relevant decision factors [3]. To prevent 
agents and hosts from cheating, we show how existing 
methods from the literature can be used to protect the 
information on which the decision making is based. The 
overall approach is the following. A mobile agent that travels 
through many hosts will accumulate data as it travels. This 
data is presented to the next host to be visited and fed into a 
fuzzy logic controller to reach the decision. On the other 
hand, the agent has its own fuzzy logic controller that allows 
the agent to decide where to go next. This decision is based 
on information that an agent has about the platform it wants 
to visit. Both types of information that feed the fuzzy logic 
controllers must be appropriately protected, for which the 
literature provides appropriate protocols. 
Section 2 presents related work on calculating the trust 
level of an agent, followed by section 3, which discusses 
how to integrate the proposals from the literature with the 
fuzzy logic controller for the platform. Section 4 presents 
related work on agent routing, followed by section 5 which 
shows how the proposals from the literature can be 
integrated with the fuzzy logic controller for the agent 
decision mechanism. Section 6 evaluates our proposals by 
showing a number of simulation experiments from the home 
scenario. Section 7 shows how the simulation is 
implemented. Section 8 discusses a mechanism used to 
protect our decision factors, and the last section concludes 
and suggests future works. 
II. RELATED WORK ON CALCULATING TRUST LEVELS 
The Primary purpose of agents is to gather information 
on their travels. When an agent platform decides what trust 
level to give to an agent, it must base its decision on 
appropriate factors. Here, we discuss a number of proposals 
for such factors, and we also suggest one of our own (Agent 
Behavior). 
A. Path History 
When an agent travels a multi-hop itinerary, it visits 
many platforms that are not all trusted to the same extent. 
The newly visited platform may benefit from the answer to 
the following questions: where has the agent been? How 
likely it is the agent has been converted to a malicious agent 
during its trip? To enable the platform to answer these 
questions, a mobile agent should maintain an authenticated 
record of previously visited platform during its travel history. 
Using this history, the platform can make the decision 
whether to run the agent and what level of trust, services, 
resources and privileges should be granted to the agent [4, 5]. 
Ordille suggests two techniques, in the first one, each 
host, Ai, adds itself to the path history of an agent and signs 
the complete path. The destination host, Ai+1, verifies the 
signature and determines whether it can trust the agent after 
it has visited all the hosts in the path history. In the second 
technique, host Ai that forwards the agent to another host, 
Ai+1, signs an annotation for the next hop Ai → Ai+1. Ai 
supplies the list of signed and Ai +1 authenticates the path of 
the agent by authenticating each signed hop annotation. 
These two techniques make it possible to calculate a trust 
level for agents that are roaming a network. 
B. Time 
Grimley and Monroe [6] use the factor of time to help 
identify a malevolent host. If the amount of time needed to 
execute a mobile agent on a host is limited, then the chance 
that it would become malicious is assumed to be minimized. 
Once the maximum amount of time needed by a mobile 
agent to execute safely on an entrusted host is exceeded, the 
agent must shut down or move to the next host specified on 
its itinerary. Therefore, the execution time is a useful 
decision factor. 
C. Path Pattern 
There are two types of mobile agent: a one-hop agent and 
a multi-hop agent. A one-hop agent is an agent that only 
migrates from one host to another and back, or it can also 
stay at the destination host. On the other hand, a multi-hop 
agent is a mobile agent that travels through many hosts [5]. 
For a multi-hop agent, the list of hosts visited is the path 
history. 
Cao and Lu [7] represent the path history as a sequence 
of host identifiers like “h1h2 . . . hn”. A path pattern is a 
regular expression that uses host identifiers as its alphabet to 
match a set of paths with some property. For example, 
"*hahb*" matches the paths of the agents which have 
travelled to ha and then directly to hb. 
D. Ordered Shortest Path 
It is also useful to be able to reason about whether an 
agent has taken the shortest path, the second shortest, etc. 
The shortest path represents the lowest risk for the agent, the 
second shortest path through a network is assumed to be 
provided by the routing layer, for example by the open 
shortest path first (OSPF) protocol [8]. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that each host knows the shortest path 
to other hosts. 
E. Agent Behaviour 
A more abstract decision factor is the agent behavior. An 
agent that is performing its task according to its normal 
routines is given a good mark. An agent behaving in a 
normal fashion always uses a correct path and reasonable 
amount of processing time to execute, while an agent is 
deemed to be bad if it behaves anomalously, for example 
when it makes a detour on the internet for no good reason. 
In our trust level calculations we use a number of the 
factors above by way of example, other factors can be 
accommodated too. 
III. TRUST LEVEL CALCULATION 
Based on the scenario from the introduction, and using 
some decision factors from section 2, we will show a number 
of examples of how an FLC can be used to make decisions 
on the trust level of an agent. The output of the FLC is a 
prediction of the level of trust attributed to the agent. We 
classify the level of trust in three categories, as follows: 
High, Medium, and Low. This classification is then used by 
the host to determine the requirements put on the visiting 
agent, as well as the services, and resources granted to the 
visiting agent [2]. If the trust level of the agent is High, the 
agent is granted access to all resources of the host, the 
computing resources, memory usage and only simple 
authentication is required. If the trust level of the agent is 
Medium, the agent is allowed to execute but only granted a 
limited memory usage with a sufficient data access. 
However, the authentication process is sophisticated, and a 
security mechanism is being applied while the agent is 
executing i.e. Sandboxing, Proof-carrying Code (PCC), or 
Code-Signing. The worst scenario is when the agent is 
deemed to be malicious as indicated by a Low trust level; in 
this case, the agent is rejected upon its arrival. The 
classification table is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I.  AGENT TRUST LEVEL 
Agent 
Trust 
Level 
Status Authentication Data Access 
Memory 
usage Security 
High Accept Simple 
Granted 
to all 
data 
access 
Allowed 
to use 
memory 
as much 
as it 
requires 
Simple 
security 
protocol 
Medium Accept 
Sophisticat
ed 
authenticati
on process 
Granted 
adequate 
data 
access 
Granted 
limited 
memory 
Sandbox
ing, 
PCC, 
Code 
Signing 
Low Reject None None None None 
 
A. Refinement of the Scenario 
Before we delve into the details of the FLC that supports 
the agent decision making, we discuss our running example 
again. Table II shows in more detail than Fig. 1 what the 
trust levels are at each of the 5 steps taken by the guest agent, 
and what the possible routes are at each stage. 
TABLE II.  DETAILS FOR THE SCENARIO 
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
Step 10 90 50 50 60 80 - 
1 √ X X X X X X 
2 X 91.4>90 √ X X X X X 
3 
(a,b) X X X 
51.3>50 
√(b) 
51.3<60 
X(a) X X 
4 
(a,b,c) X 
52.4<90 
X(b) 
52.4>50 
√(c) X 
52.4<60 
X(a) X X 
5 X X X X 63.2>60 √ X X 
6 X X X 52 > 50 √ X X X 
7 X X X X 79 > 60 √ X X 
8 X X X 64.2>50 √ X X X 
9 X X X X X X √ 
 
Table II shows that the “guest” agent is triggered at the 
front door (step 1). From the front door the next (and only) 
destination is calculated, which is HCS. Upon arrival at the 
HCS, the trust level of the agent is 91.4, which is greater 
than the threshold 90, and thus high enough for the agent to 
be accepted at the HCS. A step3, the agent selects KD as the 
first candidate to be visited (label a), but since the trust level 
of the agent, i.e. 51.3 is lower than the threshold 60, the 
agent is rejected and then migrates to the second candidate 
(label b), i.e. the TV where it is accepted. In step 4, the agent 
chooses KD as the first candidate (label a) and HCS as the 
second (label b) but gets rejected at the both, therefore the 
agent migrates to the third candidate (label c) SP where its 
trust level (51.3 > 50) is high enough to be accepted. Step 5, 
from SP the agent then tries to go to the KD again, and at 
this step, its trust level is sufficient to be accepted. The 
process continues until step 9 where the agent is terminated. 
In this detailed scenario we can see that the agent is 
terminated at step 9 because its trust level (1.e 9.7) is lower 
than the threshold of any of the devices inside the house. The 
trust level is getting lower each time the agent is migrating. 
The factor that causes this is the length of the path taken by 
the agent (c.f Section 2.A). However, this is not realistic, 
because logically the longer a person (and the accompanying 
agent) stays in a house, the more trust should be granted to 
the person. Therefore, the path length is increased only when 
the agent steps out of the house (for example to roam the 
internet). While staying inside the house, the path length is 
not increased. After changing the FLC to follow this more 
realistic path history rule, the simulation shows that the guest 
agent is never terminated, as long as it remains in the home. 
Space precludes us from showing the change to the FLC, but 
it is simple indeed, thus indicating that our approach using 
FLC is flexible. 
B. The FLC 
We present a high level description of the FLC that is 
used to calculate the trust level shown in Table I. The FLC 
that calculates the candidate destinations is discussed in 
section 5. The flexibility of an FLC makes it easy to add 
more rules and linguistic variables to embrace new decision 
factors. 
In Section 2, we have discussed some of the decision 
factors that we believe have a major effect in calculating the 
Trust Level. 
Among all of those decision factors, we have taken Path 
length, Time, and Behavior as our parameters to be fed into 
the FLC. 
As have been explained briefly in Section 2, the Path 
length is taken into consideration because it will show how 
far the agent has traveled, and we believe that the longer the 
path the higher possibility for the agent to be affected by any 
malicious entity. 
We also take Time as one of our decision factor, because 
we believe that if an agent executes longer than normal, the 
possibility for that agent to be malicious is higher. 
The Behavior decision factor is the extended utilization 
of the other decision factors. For example, if an agent takes a 
detour, there is a possibility for that agent to be malicious. 
These three decision factors are fed into the FLC to 
produce the trust level of the agent upon its arrival. After the 
trust level of this agent is calculated, the platform will update 
the previous decision factors based on the agent’s activities. 
The Path length will be updated by adding the number of 
hops traveled by the agent. The Time decision factor is 
updated based on the time taken by the agent to execute at 
the given host, and the behavior is updated by observing the 
path traveled, and the execution time of an agent at the given 
host. For example, if the agent does not follow the path 
pattern or it takes longer than normal, the agent is labeled 
with bad behavior and vice versa. The Behavior decision 
factor can be updated based on any other decision factors, it 
is not only limited to Path length and Time.  
The calculation of the trust level requires a rule base and 
a set of equation, which are given in Appendix A of this 
paper. 
IV. DECISION FACTORS FOR ROUTING SELECTION 
When an agent platform decides to reject a visiting 
mobile agent, it is critical for the agent to find an alternative 
platform it can visit. To decide on the alternative platform to 
be visited, the decision of the routing selection FLC must be 
based on appropriate factors. Here we discuss a number of 
proposals for such factors. 
A. Number of Neighbors 
In a smart home environment, the devices that are 
working together are connected via a wireless of wired 
network (indicated by dashed lines in Fig. 1). The mobile 
agents embedded in these devices are expected to migrate 
from node to node. Since the number of devices in a smart 
home is relatively small, it is reasonable to assume that each 
device knows the number of neighbors connected to it, and 
also the number of neighbors connected to its neighbors. We 
believe that the number of neighbors connected to the next 
visited nodes is important because in the case of rejection at 
the visited nodes, the mobile agent will have more alternative 
nodes to be visited. Marwaha et al [9] and Liu et al [10] use 
this decision factor in a wireless routing protocol. Here, we 
are trying to use it in a mobile agent environment. 
B. Number of Accepts and Rejects 
To decide the next destination of a multi-hop mobile 
agent, we believe that the number of accepts and rejects in 
the previous attempts is important. A mobile agent that 
travels through many platforms will keep records of each 
platform it has visited. These records also contain the 
information about the previous actions given to the mobile 
agent by the platform; it includes the reason for rejection or 
acceptance by the visited platform. In our protocol, the 
number of rejects and accepts at the previous visited nodes 
indicates the likelihood of the mobile agent to visit the same 
nodes again. If the number of the accepts and rejects is zero, 
the likelihood to visit this node is higher because it has not 
been visited before. 
V. ROUTING SELECTION 
Based on the scenario from the introduction, and the 
decision factors from Section 4, we show how an FLC can 
be used to determine the next destination of a mobile agent. 
The output of the FLC is a prediction of the best platform to 
be visited next. The FLC will take two major decision factors 
into account, which are: the number of Rejects and Accepts, 
and the number of immediate Neighbors connected to the 
next possible platform to be visited. Referring back to Table 
II, at each step one or more labeled boxes indicate the 
candidate destinations at this point. They are ordered by 
candidate number (a, b, c etc.), and they are tried in this 
order. 
The number of candidates varies; it depends on the 
number of neighbors of the platform where the agent is at 
present. 
Now, let us consider the simulation from section 3, where 
the trust level of the agent is Low, which causes rejection at 
the KD when the agent tries to migrate for the first time from 
HCS to KD. 
The rejection at KD (step 3a) will trigger the FLC at the 
agent side to present the next candidate destination to be 
visited. The FLC selects the TV (step 3b) as the second 
candidate. Therefore, the agent now tries to migrate to TV. 
Upon arrival at TV, the agent trust level is now calculated at 
TV side by using the trust level FLC and accepted at TV 
(step 3b). 
A. The FLC 
We present a high level description of the FLC that is 
used to calculate the Routing Selection. 
Fig. 1 shows only a small collection of devices in a smart 
home. In a real smart home, there are more devices and more 
connections. Let us assume for example that KD is 
connected to 3 devices, i.e TV, HCS, and SP. Therefore, the 
FLC now has to calculate which device (TV, HCS, SP) is the 
best candidate to be visited next. 
Assume that TV has 3 neighbors and the agent has 
always been accepted at every attempt by the TV. HCS has 4 
neighbors, and the agent has been rejected and accepted at 
least once in HCS. SP has 2 neighbors and it has been visited 
only once. Based on these decision factors the FLC will now 
decide which candidate neighbor is the most promising. 
Appendix B shows the details of the routing selection FLC. 
After the best candidate is selected, the mobile agent then 
updates the information about all the candidates as the 
feedback for the future routing selection. The number of 
neighbors decision factor does not change unless there is a 
new device is installed in the house. However, the number of 
accepts and rejects at each platform is updated because it will 
determine whether the mobile agent should select the 
platform again later. 
VI. OTHER SCENARIOS 
In this section we show three further scenarios of an 
agent serving a person in the smart home. Table III 
represents a guest agent that is roaming around the house and 
behaving oddly by migrating to the Internet (outside entity), 
where as Table IV and V represent an agent that acts for the 
home owner with various behaviors. 
TABLE III.  GUEST AGENT TRAVELS BY MIGRATING TO THE INTERNET 
(OUTSIDE ENTITY) 
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
Step 10 90 50 50 60 20 - 
1 √ X X X X X X 
2 X 91.4>90 √ X X X X X 
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
3 
(a, b) X X X 
51.3>50 
√(b) 
51.3<60 
X(a) X X 
4 
(a,b,c) X 
52.4<90 
X(b) 
52.4>50 
√(c) X 
52.4<60 
X(a) X X 
5 X X X X X 34.6>20 √ X 
6 
(a, b) X X X 
17.8<50 
X(b) 
17.8<60 
X(a) X √ 
 
The first four steps in Table 3 are the same as in Table II. 
The differences begin when the “guest” agent migrates to the 
Internet which indicates unusual behavior of the agent (Step 
5). 
We have stated before that the path traveled by the agent 
inside the house can be considered as zero, while stepping 
out of the house should increase the path length. The Low 
trust level is calculated on the basis of this more realistic 
notion of path length causes the agent to be banned from any 
further interaction in the home. 
TABLE IV.  HOME OWNER AGENT TRAVELS WITHOUT MIGRATING TO 
THE INTERNET (OUTSIDE ENTITY) 
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
Step 10 90 50 50 60 80 - 
1 √ X X X X X X 
2 X X X X 79.4>60 √ X X 
3 X X X 51.3>50 √ X X X 
4 X X 58.8>50 √ X X X X 
5 X X X 55.1>60 √ X X X 
6 X X X X 69.8>60 √ X X 
7 X X X 63.3>60 √ X X X 
… … … … … … … … 
 
Table 4 above shows how the agent accompanying the 
home owner is accepted at every step by every device in the 
house. This special treatment is only applicable while the 
home owner agent is roaming inside the house. 
TABLE V.  HOME OWNER AGENT TRAVELS BY MIGRATING TO THE 
INTERNET (OUTSIDE ENTITY) 
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
Step 10 90 50 50 60 20 - 
1 √ X X X X X X 
… … … … … … … … 
8 X X 56.3>50 √ X X X X 
Compile and 
Run Trust Level 
at the Platform
Compile an 
Run Routing 
Selection at the 
Agent
The best Candidate is 
selected
Update 
Parameters to 
Calculate Trust 
Level at the next 
visited node
Agent Updates 
the Number of 
RejectsReject
Accept
Initial 
Decision 
Factors Agent Side
Platform Side
1
Select the next 
Candidate
Agent Updates 
the Number of 
Accepts
Agent 
Execution at 
the Platform
2
5
6
3
4
7
8
 FD HCS SP TV KD Int Stop 
Threshold 
9 X X X X X 56.3>20 √ X 
10 X X 71.3>50 √ X X X X 
11 X X X 57.2>50 √ X X X 
… … … … … … … … 
 
Migrating to the Internet also reduces the trust level of 
the home owner. Most of the steps of Table 5 are the same as 
Table 4, and therefore not shown. The differences start at 
step 9 where the agent migrates from the phone (SP) to the 
Internet (Int) and back to the phone (SP). But since this agent 
represents the home owner, the agent still gets accepted at 
every device inside the house. The case of rejection only 
occurs when the agent e3xtensively on the Internet, which 
causes its level of trust to be really low. 
VII. IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of the agent simulator has been 
written using Matlab 2008 Simulink. The steps of the 
simulation process are shown in Fig. 2. 
Figure 2.  Simulation Process Flow Diagram. 
The system contains two major subsystems, which are; 
the Trust Level at the platform side, and the Routing 
Selection at the mobile agent side. In the simulation we show 
how these subsystems are working together. The subsystem 
at the platform side decides whether to accept or reject a 
visiting agent, while in the other side, the Routing selection 
subsystem decides the next destination for a mobile agent in 
the case of rejection. 
Fig. 2 shows the process flow of the simulation. At the 
start, the initial decision factors required for the trust level 
calculation are embedded in the agent (arrow 1). The agent 
then determines the next node to be visited by calculating the 
routing selection using the FLC at the agent side. After the 
next destination is determined, the agent then migrates to the 
destination while carrying the parameters (arrow 2). At the 
platform side, these parameters are used to calculate the trust 
level using the FLC. 
The result from the trust level calculation is then used to 
determine whether the agent is accepted or rejected. 
The agent that has been accepted (arrow 5) updates the 
number of accepts of the visited platform and is allowed to 
execute at the platform. After executing, the platform then 
updates the decision factors of the agent for the next 
calculation (arrow 7). 
In a case of rejection (arrow 3), the agent updates the 
number of rejects of the respective platform and runs the 
routing selection again to choose the next best destination 
after the previous attempt (arrow 4). 
The simulation goes on until the trust level of the agent is 
getting so low that the agent gets stuck, or until the user 
watching the simulation has been convinced that the two 
FLC works as they are intended to. 
VIII. PROTECTING DECISION FACTORS 
In this section, we discuss a mechanism to protect the 
decision factors that are used to calculate the trust level. 
Most mobile code systems consider the platform as a trusted 
entity and therefore they do not provide any mechanism to 
protect agent execution. In this proposed system, the 
information or decision factors regarding of an agent is 
updated each time the agent finished executing. Therefore, 
we need a technique to protect the decision factors itself 
from being changed or tampered by any party. 
If such unwanted things occur, we would like to know 
any possible unauthorized modification of the agent code or 
state. However, we cannot predict the information that an 
agent will receive from the platform it is running on or from 
other agents. 
As the solution for this problem, we use a Cryptographic 
traces method introduced by Vigna [11]. The proposed 
protocols assumes that all the involved principals, namely 
users and site owner or in our case as platform and the home 
owner, own a public key and a secret key that can be used for 
encryption and digital signatures. Further explanation about 
this mechanism  can be found in [11]. 
IX. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In previous work [2] we have provided an overview of 
mechanisms designed to protect mobile agent platform from 
malicious mobile agents by calculating the mobile agent trust 
level. The trust level is used to decide actions that should be 
given to the mobile agent when it arrives at a platform. These 
actions are categorized into three categories. One of these 
actions is to reject the incoming mobile agent. Then a 
question of how the mobile agent should react in the case of 
rejection is raised, and what alternatives actions should it 
performs for a given situation.  
We argue that the mobile agent should be able to migrate 
to another platform in the case of rejection at the previous 
platform. We have used a Fuzzy Logic Controller as a 
defense mechanism for mobile agent routing selection. In 
this paper, the simulation of how these two decision 
mechanisms are interrelated is also given.  
Finally, we show by example of how Fuzzy Logic can be 
used with the relevant decision factors to perform routing 
selection for a mobile agent. 
For future work, we would like to work out the examples 
in more details, and build a full simulation of a smart home 
that supports a variety of realistic usage scenarios. 
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APPENDIX  
A. Trust Level Calculation 
The rule base for the trust level calculation is formed by 
12 rules and 3decision factors which are: Time (T), Path 
Length (PL), and Behavior (B). We refer to the rules by the 
number given. 
1. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Long)&(B=Bad)THEN(TL=Low) 
2. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Long)&(B=Norm)THEN(TL=Low) 
3. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Short)&(B=Bad)THEN(TL=Low) 
4. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Long)&(B=Bad)THEN(TL=Low) 
5. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Short)&(B=Norm)THEN(TL=Med) 
6. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Short)&(B=Good)THEN(TL=Med) 
7. IF(T=Slow)&(PL=Long)&(B=Good)THEN(TL=Med) 
8. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Long)&(B=Norm)THEN(TL=Med) 
9. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Long)&(B=Good)THEN(TL=Med) 
10. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Short)&(B=Norm)THEN(TL=Med) 
11. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Short)&(B=Norm)THEN(TL=Med) 
12. IF(T=Fast)&(PL=Short)&(B=Good)THEN(TL=High) 
 
Based on the Fuzzy Logic framework, the Crisp output to 
calculate the trust level is as follows. 
The Firing Strength for i  ∈ {Fast, Slow, Short, Long, 
Good, Normal, Bad} is defined by the Gaussian normal 
function with the parameters ki, wi, µi, and σi. 
Take into consideration the decision factors, namely: 
 
Time: 
A = {fast, slow} 
 
Path Length: 
B = {long, short} 
 
Behaviour: 
C = {good, normal, bad} 
 
Trust Level: 
T = {high, medium, low} 
 
The decision rule as: 
D = {rule1, …, rule12} 
 
Let the decision rule be a random variable 
TCBAD →××:                                                     (1) 
 
For example, 
( ) tcbad →,,:  
( ) lowbadlongslowrule →,,:1  
 
The firing strength for each decision factor is then 
calculated using the following equation. 
 
Firing Strength: 
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For every case Ai ∈ , Bi ∈ , and Ci ∈  respectively. 
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The Fuzzy Output that takes into consideration the 
decision factors time T, path length P, and behaviour B is 
defined by the following equation. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) tcbad zfyfxfzyxg µ⋅⋅⋅=,,                     (3) 
 
For every decision of rule d, given by (1), and the value 
of CcBbAa ∈∈∈ ,, , and Tt ∈ followed by the 
corresponding random variable d. 
 
 
 
For example, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Highgoodshortfastrule zfyfxfzyxg µ⋅⋅⋅=,,  
 
The Crisp output for the trust level is calculated by 
dividing the total fuzzy output by the total firing strength 
from each rule. The equation to calculate the Crisp output is 
therefore: 
 
Crisp Output: 
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B. Routing Selection Calculation 
The rule base for the routing selection calculation is 
formed by 9 rules and 2 decision factors which are: Number 
of accepts (#A), and Number of immediate nodes (#N). We 
refer the rules by number given. 
1. IF(#A = Reject)&(#N = Small)THEN(Output = 3rd Cand) 
2. IF(#A = Reject)&(#N = Med)THEN(Output = 2nd  Cand) 
3. IF(#A = Reject)&(#N = Large)THEN(Output = 2nd  Cand) 
4. IF(#A = None)&(#N = Small)THEN(Output = 2nd  Cand) 
5. IF(#A = None)&(#N = Med)THEN(Output = 1st  Cand) 
6. IF(#A = None)&(#N = Large)THEN(Output = 1st  Cand) 
7. IF(#A = Accept)&(#N = Small)THEN(Output = 3rd Cand) 
8. IF(#A = Accept)&(#N = Med)THEN(Output = 2nd  Cand) 
9. IF(#A = Accept)&(#N = Large)THEN(Output = 1st  Cand) 
 
Based on Fuzzy Logic framework, the Crisp output for 
the decision making is as follows. 
The firing strength for ∈i {Small. Medium, Large, 
Reject, None, Accept} is defined by the Gaussian normal 
function with the parameters ki, wi, µi, and σi .  
Take into consideration the decision factors, namely: 
 
Number of immediate nodes: 
A = {small, medium, large} 
 
Number of attempts: 
B = {reject, none, accept} 
 
Output candidate 
C = {1st Candidate, 2nd Candidate, 3rd Candidate} 
 
And the decision rule as: 
D = {rule1, …, rule9} 
 
Let the decision rule be a random variable 
CBAD →×:                                                     (1) 
 
For example, 
( ) cbad →,:  
( ) erdCandidatsmallrejectrule 3,:1 →  
 
The firing strength for each decision factor is then 
calculated using the following equation. 
 
Firing Strength: 
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For every case Ai ∈ ,and  Bi ∈  respectively. 
 
For example, 
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The Fuzzy Output takes into consideration the decision 
factors, namely, number of immediate node A, and number 
of attempts B is defined by the following equation. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) cbad yfxfzyxg µ⋅⋅=,,                     (3) 
 
For every decision of rule d, given by (1), and the value 
of CcBbAa ∈∈∈ ,, followed by the corresponding 
random variable d. 
 
For example, 
( ) ( ) ( ) erdCandidatrejectsmallrule yfxfzyxg 3,, µ⋅⋅=  
 
The Crisp output for the routing selection is calculated by 
dividing the total fuzzy output by the total firing strength 
from each rule. The equation to calculate the Crisp output is 
therefore: 
 
 
Crisp Output: 
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Example: 
 
In the scenario from Section 5.A, the agent at the kitchen 
door (KD) has to select the next best destination among three 
nodes which are home-control system (HCS), TV and smart 
phone (SP). The parameters chosen for the membership 
functions and the Fuzzy Output for each of the three nodes 
(HCS, TV, and SP) are shown in the following table. 
TABLE VI.  PARAMETERS OF THE MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS 
Input 
Parameters µ σ w K TV HCS FD 
 
Neighbors 
Few    0 ≤ µ ≤ 5 1.6  
 
 
 
3 - 2 
Some 3 ≤ µ ≤ 7 1.6 - 4 - 
Many   5 ≤ µ ≤ 10 1.6  
1 
-0.5 - - - 
 
Attempts 
Reject -10 ≤ µ ≤ 0  
3.3 
 
1 
 
-0.5 
- - - 
None 0 - - - 
Accept    0 ≤ µ ≤ 10 1 1 1 
 
Output 
1st  Cand 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 0.9      - 
2nd Cand 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 0.84 - - 
3rd Cand 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 - - 0.63 
 
Table VI above shows that the highest or the closest 
Crisp output to 1 is 0.9, and it is indicated by the dark shade 
inside the table. Therefore, the next node to be visited by the 
guest agent is node number 2 which is smart phone (SP). 
Unlike the calculation for the trust level, the parameters and 
the results that are presented in Table VI are calculated 
separately for each node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
